On the Question of Human Dignity

The word of the week is “Dignity.” Much ink has already been spilled over the Vatican’s new document, “Dignitas Infinita,” and I have no intention of rehashing the articles and arguments regarding it in this newsletter. But there is an essential aspect that needs to be discussed.

Pro-lifers are satisfied with the document because it reaffirms the right to life of all preborn children and condemns euthanasia. The homosexualists are satisfied with the document because it affirms “that every person, regardless of sexual orientation, ought to be respected in his or her dignity and treated with consideration, while ‘every sign of unjust discrimination’ is to be carefully avoided.” Transgenders and their advocates are dissatisfied with the document because it condemns transgender surgeries and ideologies. The peaceniks are pleased because the document attacks Just War theory. The social justice activists are happy because it reasserts the Church’s teaching on the necessity of giving aid to the poor. And while there is so much discussion on the effects of the document in its practical assertions, what is mostly left out of the discussion is the foundational nature of the whole thing, which is the definition and understanding of “human dignity.”

The word “dignity” is derived from the Latin word “dignus,” which means “worth, worthy, proper or fitting.” Dignitatem means “worthiness,” and the oldest use of the current word “dignity” comes from the Old French word, “dignete,” which is “a state of being worthy.” In all of this discussion on human dignity, even in the portions wherein Cdl. Víctor Manuel Fernandez goes to great lengths to discuss the essential components of human dignity, and the four types he identifies, there is no single clear definition of what is meant by “human dignity.” And the problem with failing to define the meaning of the word is that it then becomes an ambiguous buzzword that can be used indiscriminately to either justify or condemn certain ideologies without any real firm understanding of the nature of what is being justified or condemned..

In the very opening lines of the document, Cdl. Fernandez makes several raw assertions about human dignity without clarifications or anything to substantiate his claims. He wrote:

“Every human person possesses an infinite dignity, inalienably grounded in his or her very being, which prevails in and beyond every circumstance, state, or situation the person may ever encounter. This principle, which is fully recognizable even by reason alone, underlies the primacy of the human person and the protection of human rights.”

The only support for the claim that “every human person possesses an infinite dignity” is found in paragraph 6, wherein he cites Pope Francis’ encyclical Evangelii Gaudium. He writes:

“From the start of his pontificate, Pope Francis has invited the Church to ‘believe in a Father who loves all men and women with an infinite love, realizing that ‘he thereby confers upon them an infinite dignity.’”

So, the claim here is that all human persons possess “infinite dignity” based upon an “invitation” to believe that all men and women have it because God the Father “loves all men and women with an infinite love.” The “inalienable” dignity, which Cdl. Fernandez asserts is an ontological reality (as in, it is a dignity inherent in the very nature of human beings themselves) remains an unsubstantiated given, backed only by citations of Pope Francis and the UN Declaration on Human Rights. In paragraph 14, he writes:

“From this perspective, we can understand how the word ‘dignity’ was used in the 1948 United Nations Declaration, which speaks about ‘the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family.’ Only this inalienable character of human dignity makes it possible to speak about human rights.”

In paragraph 7, Cdl. Fernandez indicates that there are four types of human dignity, stating the following:

“This brings us to recognize the possibility of a fourfold distinction of the concept of dignity: ontological dignity, moral dignity, social dignity, and existential dignity.”

He defines “ontological dignity” as dignity “that belongs to the person as such simply because he or she exists and is willed, created, and loved by God. Ontological dignity is indelible and remains valid beyond any circumstances in which the person may find themselves.”

In paragraph 11, he explains that such dignity is founded upon the image and likeness of God with which all men are made, saying:

“to be created in the image of God means to possess a sacred value that transcends every distinction of a sexual, social, political, cultural, and religious nature. Our dignity is bestowed upon us by God; it is neither claimed nor deserved. Every human being is loved and willed by God and, thus, has an inviolable dignity.”

He defines “moral dignity” as “how people exercise their freedom.” In other words, this is a kind of dignity that can be lost due to sin, as he explains:

“this possibility always exists for human freedom, and history illustrates how individuals—when exercising their freedom against the law of love revealed by the Gospel—can commit inestimably profound acts of evil against others. Those who act this way seem to have lost any trace of humanity and dignity. This is where the present distinction can help us discern between the moral dignity that de facto can be ‘lost’ and the ontological dignity that can never be annulled. And it is precisely because of this latter point that we must work with all our might so that all those who have done evil may repent and convert.”

The third kind of dignity according to Cdl. Fernandez is “social dignity,” which relates to one’s living conditions pertaining to their social status. He explains:

“For example, in cases of extreme poverty, where individuals do not even have what is minimally necessary to live according to their ontological dignity, it is said that those poor people are living in an ‘undignified’ manner. This expression does not imply a judgment on those individuals but highlights how the situation in which they are forced to live contradicts their inalienable dignity.”

And the final type of dignity for Cdl. Fernandez is “existential dignity.”  This type of dignity appears to be entirely subjective, based upon nothing but environmental conditions which affect the “peace, joy, and hope” of the individuals involved. He explains:

“For instance, while some people may appear to lack nothing essential for life, for various reasons, they may still struggle to live with peace, joy, and hope. In other situations, the presence of serious illnesses, violent family environments, pathological addictions, and other hardships may drive people to experience their life conditions as ‘undignified’ vis-à-vis their perception of that ontological dignity that can never be obscured. These distinctions remind us of the inalienable value of the ontological dignity that is rooted in the very being of the human person in all circumstances.”

Based upon these precepts of the definition and nature of human dignity, Cdl. Fernandez moves to indicate violations of human dignity, and without delving into details on why he makes these claims, I’ll simply list what these violations are: extreme poverty, war, The Travail of Migrants, Human Trafficking, Sexual Abuse, Violence Against Women, Abortion, Surrogacy, Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide, The Marginalization of People with Disabilities, Gender Theory, Sex Change, Digital Violence (i.e., cyber bullying).

There are several problems with these definitions, distinctions, and violations pertaining to the foundational element of what Cdl. Fernandez establishes as human dignity. In the first place, the word “sin” is used only twice throughout the entire document, both times in paragraph 22. He writes:

“each person must also strive to live up to the full measure of their dignity. In light of this, one can understand how sin can wound and obscure human dignity, as it is an act contrary to that dignity; yet, sin can never cancel the fact that the human being is created in the image and likeness of God.”

There is no mention of sin with regard to abortion, sex change operations, surrogacy, euthanasia, or any of the multitude of other “violations” of human dignity he identifies. What this document appears to do – and what it does in effect – is reduce the nature of sin to a “violation of human dignity.” And even there, he claims that the dignity inherent in all human beings, due to having been made in the image and likeness of God, can never be canceled by sin. But is this true?

To begin, let’s explore the question of whether or not man possesses “infinite dignity.”

St. Thomas Aquinas has made clear, and the popes have affirmed, that only Jesus and Mary possess “infinite dignity”; Our Lord by the nature of His Divinity, and Our Lady by virtue of her being the Mother of God. Pope Pius XI’s 1931 encyclical, Lux Veritatis, in speaking of man’s Redemption, rhetorically asked:

“how indeed could Christ be called ‘the firstborn among many brethren’ (Romans viii. 29), or be wounded because of our iniquities (Isaias liii. 5; Matt. viii. 17), and redeem us from the servitude of sin, unless He had a human nature like as we have? And so, too, how could He make perfect satisfaction to the justice of the Heavenly Father which had been violated by mankind, unless He possessed an immense and infinite dignity by reason of His Divine Person?”

And with regard to the Blessed Virgin, Pope Pius XI wrote:

“From this dogma of the divine maternity, as from the outpouring of a hidden spring, flow forth the singular grace of Mary and her dignity, which is the highest after God. Nay more, as Aquinas says admirably: ‘The Blessed Virgin, from this that she is the Mother of God, has a certain infinite dignity, from the infinite good which is God.’ (Summ. Theo., III. a.6.)”

In other words, if Our Blessed Lord possesses “infinite dignity” by virtue of His Divinity, and Our Lady possesses “a certain infinite dignity” due to her maternal relationship to God, then no other creature can claim to possess “infinite dignity.” Pope Pius XII reaffirmed this in 1953 in his encyclical, Fulgens Corona. In fact, St. Thomas Aquinas emphasizes the fact that no one outside of Jesus and Mary possesses “infinite dignity” in De Rationibus Fidei, chapter 7, wherein he wrote: “No mere man was of infinite dignity, so as to make adequate satisfaction for an offense against God.” Furthermore, he wrote in Summa Theologiae Prima Pars, Q. 25, A. 6:

“The humanity of Christ, from the fact that it is united to the Godhead; and created happiness from the fact that it is the fruition of God; and the Blessed Virgin from the fact that she is the mother of God; have all a certain infinite dignity from the infinite good, which is God. And on this account there cannot be anything better than these; just as there cannot be anything better than God.”

So, from the outset, the problematic nature of Cdl. Fernandez’ document is quickly realized. Man does not and cannot possess “infinite dignity” by virtue of his possessing the “imago dei.” This falsehood alone is enough to collapse many of the subsequent arguments contained within the document – especially those pertaining to the death penalty, just war, euthanasia, and abortion.

Now, what of the “inalienable” nature of man’s dignity? Can man lose even the ontological dignity suggested by Cdl. Fernandez?

In Pope Leo XIII’s 1900 encyclical, Tametsi Futura Prospicientibus, he asserts that the dignity of human nature is dependent upon man’s willingness to suffer as Our Lord suffered. the key paragraphs are 6 and 9:

6. … In this contest every man must be prepared to undergo hard ships and troubles for Christ’s sake. It is difficult to reject what so powerfully entices and delights. It is hard and painful to despise the supposed goods of the senses and of fortune for the will and precepts of Christ our Lord. But the Christian is absolutely obliged to be firm, and patient in suffering, if he wish to lead a Christian life. Have we forgotten of what Body and of what Head we are the members? ‘Having joy set before Him, He endured the Cross,’ and He bade us deny ourselves. The very dignity of human nature depends upon this disposition of mind.
7. … To reject dogma is simply to deny Christianity. Our intellect must bow humbly and reverently “unto the obedience of Christ,” so that it be held captive by His divinity and authority: ‘bringing into captivity every understanding unto the obedience of Christ’ (2 Corinthians x., 5). Such obedience Christ requires, and justly so. For He is God, and as such holds supreme dominion over man’s intellect as well as over his will. By obeying Christ with his intellect man by no means acts in a servile manner, but in complete accordance with his reason and his natural dignity.

In other words, man derives his dignity by his unity with Christ. When we are in a state of grace, and we conform our wills with His Will, and we willfully dispose ourselves to the Cross, then we possess that dignity which God intends for us. In his 1885 encyclical Immortale Dei, Pope Leo XIII wrote:

“If the mind assents to false opinions, and the will chooses and follows after what is wrong, neither can attain its native fullness, but both must fall from their native dignity into an abyss of corruption.”

It’s a simple proposition – by uniting and conforming our wills with the Will of God, we possess the nature of our human dignity, and when we choose false opinions and lead a life contrary to that Will, we fall from that dignity.

St. Thomas Aquinas makes it abundantly clear in three different sections of his Summa that dignity is not “inalienable.” In Summa Theologica III, Q.89, A.3, he wrote:

“By sin, man loses a twofold dignity, one in respect of God, the other in respect of the Church. In respect of God he again loses a twofold dignity. one is his principal dignity, whereby he was counted among the children of God, and this he recovers by Penance, which is signified (Luke 15) in the prodigal son, for when he repented, his father commanded that the first garment should be restored to him, together with a ring and shoes. The other is his secondary dignity, viz. innocence, of which, as we read in the same chapter, the elder son boasted saying (Luke 15:29): ‘Behold, for so many years do I serve thee, and I have never transgressed thy commandments’: and this dignity the penitent cannot recover.”

This statement from the Summa is at the very heart of the current discussion on human dignity. Where Cdl. Fernandez asserts that man possesses an “infinite” and “inalienable” dignity merely by virtue of having been made in God’s image and likeness, St. Thomas fully refutes that idea. In fact, not only does St. Thomas explain that man can lose his human dignity in two respects, he can only regain the first aspect of this dignity by penance, while the other he may never possess again.

So, what of the notion asserted by Cdl. Fernandez that war and capital punishment are violations of human dignity? With regard to the death penalty, Cdl. Fernandez hangs on the understanding of “infinite dignity” as the reason the death penalty cannot be used, saying: “Here, one should also mention the death penalty, for this also violates the inalienable dignity of every person, regardless of the circumstances.” Regarding war, he wrote: “All wars, by the mere fact that they contradict human dignity, are “conflicts that will not solve problems but only increase them.”

In Summa Theologiae Secunda Secundae, Q. 64, A. 2, which is precisely on the question of the death penalty and dignity, St. Thomas wrote:

“By sinning man departs from the order of reason, and consequently falls away from the dignity of his manhood, in so far as he is naturally free, and exists for himself, and he falls into the slavish state of the beasts, by being disposed of according as he is useful to others. This is expressed in Psalm 48:21: ‘Man, when he was in honor, did not understand; he hath been compared to senseless beasts, and made like to them,’ and Proverbs 11:29: ‘The fool shall serve the wise.’ Hence, although it be evil in itself to kill a man so long as he preserve his dignity, yet it may be good to kill a man who has sinned, even as it is to kill a beast. For a bad man is worse than a beast, and is more harmful, as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 1 and Ethic. vii, 6).”

So, while “Dignitas Infinita” does affirm Church teaching about the evil nature of certain sins – though it fails to call them sins, and even fails to establish the intrinsically evil nature of certain sins – the failure of the entire enterprise rests in the definition and expository nature of human dignity. Man does NOT possess “infinite dignity,” and man’s dignity can be lost in two respects – one which can be restored, and the other which cannot.

The reference and reliance on the UN’s Declaration of Human Rights for defining the dignity of man is disturbing in and of itself, as it appears to concede a certain moral authority to a worldly entity that is not of the Church. Furthermore, the concepts of existential and social “dignity” admit a host of other problems which seem to be in conflict with the Church’s teaching that man’s dignity is derived from man’s unity with God’s Will – including in the Incarnate Word’s willingness to suffer.

Earlier, we established that the definition of “dignity” is “worth, worthy, proper or fitting.”  When it comes to human dignity, there is an object of dignity which begs the question, “worthy of what?”  In the fifteenth chapter of St. Luke’s Gospel Our Lord tells the parable of the prodigal son.  After falling into such a state that he is sleeping with pigs, the son returns to his father saying, “Father, I am not worthy to be called thy son …”  In the 8th chapter of St. Matthew’s Gospel, Our Lord meets the centurion with a gravely ill servant.  After Our Lord promises to go to the home of the centurion to heal the servant, the centurion responds, “Lord, I am not worthy that thou shouldst enter under my roof …”  And every Sunday, we repeat those same words in Mass: “Domine non sum dignus” – “Lord, I am not worthy.”  If worthiness is gained by grace and lost by sin, then it is impossible to consider that dignity remains with the damned souls in Hell.  While the “good” of their existence remains, their worthiness – that is, their dignity – is lost forever.

It’s hard to imagine what the purpose of this document could be, but the inherent danger of it is the establishment of a new moral paradigm founded upon an ambiguous understanding of human dignity.  This new moral paradigm can have both temporal and spiritual consequences.

Regarding the temporal, human dignity could potentially be extended to “the goodness within homosexual relationships” or “the good found within false religions.”  Regarding the spiritual, the new paradigm could lead to a new form of “universalism” (Dare we hope that all men are saved?).  If human dignity is “infinite” and can never be lost, then eternal punishment in Hell is an impossibility because the “worthiness” of the residents of Hell will necessitate their eventual reconciliation with God.

And any moral paradigm established upon those first principles will be like the house built on sand – ever shifting, never stable.  Though many will view this document as a victory for sound morality, or a convoluted statement of the obvious, the question faithful Catholics should be asking is “What will be built on this?”